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 NETWORKING WITH Branch members is such a rewarding experience; I had the pleasure of visiting the Norfolk and Suffolk Branch in England in January, where I chatted with members from different fire engineering backgrounds about a range of fire safety issues. One of the more interesting discussions was on the Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005 in England and Wales – specifically on the onus of responsibilities and liabilities between the responsible person or owner of the premises and the professional that he relies upon to ensure fire safety.
Readers of the journal have come across numerous debates concerning this piece of legislation, and the last thing I wish to do is start another. Suffice to say that many fire professionals outside the UK are taking a keen interest in the development and enforcement of the Fire Safety Order, as well as in fire risk assessments.
I would like to acknowledge the warm hospitality of Norfolk and Suffolk Branch president Eddie Meelan and his council members for accommodating my visit at short notice. I am grateful, too, for the tour of Suffolk Fire and Rescue Service headquarters, which occupies several floors of the Suffolk County Council building – a modern building with extensive glazing and large atria, presumably with a fire engineered design.
Engineered buildings
On the subject of fire engineered buildings, it occurs to me that whenever we discuss fire engineering, our attention is immediately focused on innovative and novel designs that surpass prescriptive fire codes and performance-based approaches. It is obviously true that new and/or tall buildings call for state-of-the-art fire safety expertise and therefore capture the aspirations of modern-day professional fire engineers. However, statistics have repeatedly shown that catastrophic life and property loss in fires often occurs in existing, sometimes ancient, buildings.
By way of examples, let us consider some tragic fires that have happened so far in 2008. On 2 January, a fire ravaged a 12-storey shop and office building at Urumqi, in the Xinjiang Uygur region of China. The fire destroyed the Dehui International Plaza, a market with over 2,000 stalls that occupied four lower floors and the basement. The offices on the fifth to twelfth floors were badly damaged, and the fire also spread to an adjacent hotel. Tragically, three firefighters died and another was injured, although there were no reports of civilian casualties.
On 8 February, a fire spread through a care home in Egg, western Austria. Eleven of the 23 residents died and six were hurt. At the height of the fire, 250 firefighters were in attendance. At one stage, they had to pull back for fear of structural collapse.
Two days later, an arsonist in Seoul, South Korea, burnt down a key national treasure – the Namdaemun, or South Gate, situated in the heart of the city. Some 39 fire appliances and 88 firefighters attended, but could not access the site because of heritage protection laws. External firefighting failed to save the sixth century monument.
Presently, I do not have detailed information on these incidents and it would be imprudent to pass judgment. However, it does not take much scientific evidence to support a premise that, for the structures involved, either there was a lack of effective passive and active fire protection, or there were other significant failures. It follows that, had comprehensive risk assessments been conducted and appropriate mitigation measures taken beforehand, the tragedies might well have been avoided or contained.
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