Concerns over basic residential fire precautions

I READ with interest the news report in last month’s edition about the multi-fatality blaze at Lakanal House in London, and concur with the Fire Brigade Union’s and Jenny Jones’ comments that there should be a review of all residential premises of a similar stature. However, I would go further and include within the review any residential premises of six floors or more and also buildings that do not have only one single stairway.

The reason I suggest this is that, over a period of many years, I have both attended fires within, and held the responsibility for reviewing fire safety standards in, many such blocks, and noted that a high percentage of these failed to provide basic fire safety compartmentation to areas such as refuse chute lobbies, stair lobbies, and individual flat doors and their surrounds. In addition, the occupiers often removed their ability to have clear and accessible alternate means of escape from within their maisonettes by using the route as a storage facility.

In some cases, fears over vandalism prompted the local authority, responsible for the building, to inadvertently remove fire-resisting glazing and door panels, and replace them with panels that were less susceptible to malicious damage but had no fire integrity whatsoever. I have also seen corridor ventilation removed or blocked off by both residents and the local authority, which has an impact on smoke and heat egress.

Security grilles and gates is also an issue. I understand that security in many premises is a concern, and that the fitting of metal security gates and grilles over doors and windows reduces the ability of burglars to gain entry. However, it also does the same to the firefighters, and can severely increase the time to gain access in an emergency.

I have also witnessed refurbishment of blocks where double glazing had been fitted externally and internally and, as such, completely removed fire compartmentation from single and multiple stairway premises. Furthermore, within flats themselves, there can be concerns because of tenants removing fire doors to internal rooms.

If one couples the above with a lack of automatic detection in many such blocks, one can understand the concerns being raised.

Many local authorities cannot wash their hands of part-responsibility for the current situation, and neither can the occupiers who have made the situation worse through their own failings, mostly from ignorance of required standards.

Bill Scott, fire safety adviser, St Anne’s House, Conquest Hospital

Industrial fires and construction injuries in South Africa

AS A Brit residing in South Africa, and having known and worked with some extremely professional people in Africa and abroad, I have concerns over the unnecessary increases in the number of industrial fires and construction site injuries. Many of these are a direct result of poor standards of monitoring and control brought about by the substandard appointments and management of government and quasi-government departments responsible for it.

Serious injuries and fatalities considered under Section 24 of the Health and Safety Act of the country are being poorly investigated, if at all, leaving dependents in dire straights. In addition, there are concerns that fires are not being responded to within acceptable time limits by community fire departments.

Most frightening of all is that some companies approved to the management standards ISO 9001, 9002, 14001 and 18001 have not been audited since obtaining their ISO accreditation. Indeed, two industries I visited recently had not had any form of fire risk assessment since having been accredited, seven and nine years ago respectively.

Rob Bidgood MIFireE, NDipSAM, CMIOSH